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I. Introduction
Does a person have a legal obligation to obey an unjust law? Accord-
ing to some, call them positivists, the answer is clearly affirmative: so
long as the unjust law is a valid law, one has a legal obligation to obey
it-although this does not entail that one has a moral obligation to
obey it. According to others, call them the natural law school, the
answer is clearly negative: since an unjust law is not truly a valid law,
one clearly has no obligation (legal or moral) to obey it. This disagree-
ment is not just a matter of word usage, for there are ground level
issues at stake here regarding the choice of the basic elements required
for analyzing these two key jurisprudential concepts of legal validity
and legal obligation.
Positivist analyses of legal concepts are, by reason of their concern
with the accurate and "pure" definition of the positive law, severely
restricted in their choice of analytical tools, forswearing even a covert
reference to the principles of justice and morality. Accordingly, John
Austin' attempted to provide a descriptive, value-free analysis of the
concepts of legal validity and legal obligation by breaking them down
into such allegedly neutral elements as "sovereign," "command," "sanc-
tion," etc. Austin analyzed legal obligation or duty in terms of legal
validity, legal validity in terms of the commands of a sovereign, com-
mands in terms of the expression of a desire that people behave in a
certain way, and sovereign partly in terms of having the power and
will to enforce commands by applying sanctions in the event of dis-
obedience, and partly in terms of being habitually obeyed by most
people in the society while not being in a habit of obedience to the
commands of any other individual or group. Convinced that value
considerations fall outside "the province of jurisprudence," Austin
wanted his entire analysis to be uncontaminated by any notions of
justice or morality. By contrast, the natural law view traditionally
provides a value-charged treatment of legal validity and legal obliga-
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tion, insisting that no analysis of these concepts can be adequate
unless it appeals, explicitly and unashamedly, to principles of justice
and morality.
Beneath this disagreement about the admissibility of value-charged
notions into the province of jurisprudence, the positivists and natural
law analyses of legal validity and legal obligation share two unnoticed,
but very important assumptions: both assume (1) that the same analyt-
ical tools are needed for the analysis of legal obligation as for the
analysis of legal validity, and (2) that legal validity entails legal obliga-
tion, i.e., to establish the legal validity of a law (such as the criminal
law proscription against murder) is to establish that one has a legal
obligation to obey that law.
The aim here is twofold: to discredit both these assumptions, and
then to suggest that the abandonment of them yields a coherent position
with a number of theoretical and practical advantages. The ultimate
aim is to suggest a reconciliation of the positivist and natural law
impasse by accounting for what both sides seem to have wanted to
say-allowing the positivists their descriptive, uncontaminated account
of legal validity, and yet accommodating the natural law insistence that
value-charged reference to the principles of justice and morality has a
legitimate place in the province of jurisprudence. The method of
discrediting the above-mentioned assumptions will be a detailed
discussion of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law,2 hailed by many as
one of the most important contributions to legal philosophy in this
century.3 I choose this work as my vehicle partly because of its impor-
tance: it is widely read, highly praised, and a most lucid and helpful
contribution to the literature. More importantly, though, I focus upon
Hart's book because I believe it is defective, 4 and because the defect is
traceable to the two assumptions mentioned above. My quarry is not
Hart, it is these twin assumptions held by Hart and virtually everyone
else; I wish to draw attention to these assumptions not only because
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEMT OF LAw (1961) [hereinafter referred to by page number
only].
3. "I believe Hart's book to be one of the most important and provocative volumes
in the literature of legal philosophy." Dworkin, judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 625 (1963).
"The Concept of Law is surely the most important book in the field of analytical juris-
prudence to appear for many years." Summers, Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept of Law,
1963 DUKE LJ. 629. See also Mullock, Some Comments on Professor Hart's Legal Sys.
tem-A Reply to Professor Summers, 1965 DurE L.J. 62; Singer, Book Review, 60 J. PHIL.
197 (1963); Cohen, Book Review, 71 MiN 395 (1962).
4. Pace Summers, who states, "the work is on the whole very well done; thus the
critic must often be reduced to comments that to some may seem insignificant." Supra
note 3, at 638.
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they create havoc in Hart's particular legal theory, but mainly because
they are a liability to legal theory in general.
II. Traditional Positivist Elements in Hart's Legal Theory
Although Hart expresses dissatisfaction with the adequacy of existing
positivist analyses (Austin's and Kelsen's in particular), he remains a
willing member of the positivist tradition.5 Sharing the positivist aver-
sion to any value-charged, natural law analysis of legal validity6 and
legal obligation, Hart supplies a new, presumably descriptive set of
analytical elements: the notion of rule following, the distinction be-
tween primary and secondary rules, and the internal point of view.
Despite his disputes with previous positivist analyses, it can be seen that
Hart adheres to two central positivist doctrines: that legal validity
establishes legal obligation and that a "wider" concept of legal validity
(according to which duly passed, and upheld, laws are "valid" even if
they are outrageously unjust or immoral) is to be preferred.
As a prelude, it is instructive to recognize that Hart holds the
positivist view that one has a legal obligation to obey an unjust law.
According to positivist doctrine, every valid law, i.e., a law which has
been duly passed by the legislature, signed by the executive, and (even,
perhaps) upheld by the courts, imposes a legal obligation. This positiv-
ist doctrine is implied by the two doctrines attributed to Hart in this
section: given the positivist preference for a "wider" view of legal
validity, and given the doctrine that legal validity establishes legal
obligation, it follows that one has a legal obligation to obey even those
valid laws which are unjust. Thus it is a matter of more than passing
interest to trace the way in which the doctrine that legal validity
establishes legal obligation appears in Hart's system.
5. Since 'the positivist tradition' can designate a wide variety of claims and viewpoints,
it might help to pin this phrase down to some extent. I accept Hart's own characterization:
"Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense
a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in
fact they have often done so." Pp. 181-182. In a note, Hart says that Bentham, Austin and
Kelsen all contend "that there is no necessary connexion between law and morals, or law
as it is and law as it ought to be." P. 253. In addition, Hart ascribes to positivism the
related contention (made, he says, by Bentham, Austin and Kelsen) "that the analysis or
study of meanings of legal concepts is an important study to be distinguished from . . .
the critical appraisal of law in terms of morals, social aims, functions, &c." Id. When the
positivist tradition is characterized in this way, Hart himself qualifies as a positivist. See
pp. 181-207 and his Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Hsv. L. REv.
593-602, 606-15, 621-24 (1958).
6. Again, I am content to follow Hart, who stipulates that according to "the classical
theories of Natural Law . . . there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting dis-
covery by human reason, with which man-made law must conform if it is to be valid."
P. 182.
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A. Legal Validity Establishes Legal Obligation
Though Hart never explicitly articulates this doctrine, it is discover-
able in the very wording of his central distinction between primary
rules "of obligation" and secondary rules of recognition, change and
adjudication. Primary rules of obligation require human beings "to do
or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not' 7 (the
prohibitions of the criminal law, for example, are primary rules of
obligation). Secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication,
on the other hand, "provide that human beings may by doing or saying
certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or
modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or
control their operations"" (the laws regarding contracts and wills are
secondary rules, as are laws establishing legislative and judicial proce-
dures, rules of succession, etc.). Hart makes the "general claim that in
the combination of these two types of rule there lies... 'the key to the
science of jurisprudence.' "I With this key Hart believes he has un-
locked the notion of legal validity: "To say that a given rule is valid
is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recogni-
tion and so as a rule of the system. We can indeed simply say that the
statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the
criteria provided by the rule of recognition."' 0
A small, primitive society "closely knit by ties of kinship, common
sentiment, and belief" might be imagined to live by primary rules
alone, though this "simplest form of social structure" would display
certain crippling defects." At this stage in legal evolution, Hart sug-
gests, "there might be nothing corresponding to the clear distinction
made, in more developed societies, between legal and moral rules [of
obligation]."' 2 But the introduction of secondary rules of recognition,
change and adjudication brings the society "from the pre-legal into the
legal world,"' 3 wherein "the primary rules of obligation identified
7. Pp. 78-79.
8. P. 79.
9. Id. Or again, "the main theme of this book" is that the "union (of primary and
secondary rules] may be justly regarded as the 'essence' of law." P. 151. Similarly, this
union reveals the "heart of a legal system." P. 95. In this artide, I shall not subject this
distinction to scrutiny; although in need of further clarification, the distinction is a
basically sound contribution to the literature of legal philosophy. For some critical
discussion see Summers, Singer and Cohen, supra note 3.
10. P. 100. Hart also suggests this point earlier: "in the simple operation of identifying
a given rule as possessing the required feature of being an item on an authoritative list
of rules we have the germ of the idea of legal validity." P. 93.
11. Pp. 89-91.
12. P. 165 (emphasis added).
13. Pp. 91, 165.
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through the official system are now set apart from other [moral, non-
legal] rules, which continue to exist side by side with those officially
recognized." 14 Thus in a modem legal system we have two sorts of rules
of obligation: "legal" ones ("the primary rules of obligation identified
through the official system") 15 and "non-legal" ones ("indeed in all
communities which reach this [legal] stage, there are many types of
social rule and standard lying outside the legal system"). 16 It is clearly
fair to infer from this that the "legal" rules of obligation (the primary
rules of obligation identified through the official system) impose legal
obligation, i.e., that legal validity establishes legal obligation.
A non-legal rule of obligation can be made a legal rule of obligation
if the appropriate officials make the relevant manipulations in accor-
dance with the system's secondary rules. A system is not limited merely
to officially baptizing non-legal rules as "legal," though, for the second-
ary rules also empower officials to create a legal rule of obligation
ex nihilo.YT These new creations might even, on occasion, run counter
to prevalent social practices and attitudes, and also counter to enlight-
ened moral judgment; nonetheless, so long as they are deemed valid
according to the secondary rules of recognition and adjudication, they
remain legal rules of obligation. In Hart's system, therefore, a legal
rule of obligation (imposing legal obligations) is created whenever the
relevant officials make the appropriate manipulations under the second-
ary rules of the legal system. This clearly suggests the positivists' affir-
mative answer to our question, "Does a person have a legal obligation
to obey an unjust (but valid) law?"
B. The Preference for a Wider Concept of Legal Validity
Hart's parting shots"" are fired on the traditional battlefield of the
positivists and natural lawyers: is it the case "that the criteria of legal
validity of particular laws used in a legal system must include, tacitly
if not explicitly, a reference to morality or justice"?' Or, put more
simply: are unjust but validly enacted laws "laws"? 20 The natural law
view says they are not, the positivists say they are. Hart agrees with the




17. See pp. 163-76, 195-207.
18. Before he turns to the final chapter, which discusses international law.
19. P. 181.
20. See pp. 8, 152, 203-07.
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Plainly we cannot grapple adequately with this issue if we see it
as one concerning the proprieties of linguistic usage. For what
really is at stake is the comparative merit of a wider and a nar-
rower concept or way of classifying rules, which belong to a system
of rules generally effective in social life. If we are to make a rea-
soned choice between these concepts, it must be because one is
superior to the other in the way in which it will assist our theoret-
ical inquiries, or advance and clarify our moral deliberations,
or both.21
Hart believes the wider (positivist) way of classifying laws offers both
theoretical and practical advantages. Theoretically, "nothing is to be
gained" from following the narrower concept; "nothing, surely, but
confusion could follow" from it, and "certainly no history or other
form of legal study has found it profitable to do this." 22 This is because
the narrower concept "would lead us to exclude certain rules [namely,
those which "offend against a society's own morality or against what we
may hold to be an enlightened or true morality"] even though they
exhibit all the other complex characteristics of law"; such a procedure
"must inevitably split, in a confusing way, our effort to understand
both the development and potentialities of the specific method of
social control to be seen in a system of primary and secondary rules.
Study of its use involves study of its abuse." 23
Nor does Hart see any "practical merits" in the narrower concept.
First, it seems unlikely to lead to "a stiffening of resistance to evil."'24
For, after all, whenever they can control the legal machinery, "Wicked
men will enact wicked rules which others will enforce." 25 Second, Hart
believes the most effective weapon "in confronting the official abuse
of power" is the traditional positivistic doctrine that, though legal
validity may entail binding legal obligation, this does not entail over-
riding moral obligation. He asserts that "the certification of something
as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience," because
the demands of the legal system "must in the end be submitted to a
moral scrutiny"; or again, "there is something outside the official
system, by reference to which in the last resort the individual must
solve his problems of obedience."26 Third, Hart regards the narrower






26. Id. (emphasis added).
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for any purpose" as defective because it "may grossly oversimplify" the
variety of "delicate and complex moral issues" created by "iniquitous
rules." 27
In these passages Hart does not explicitly discuss "legal obligation,"
but only "legal validity." As noted, what he here says about "the
question of obedience" clearly indicates that "obedience" in this con-
text refers to moral obligation. Nonetheless, these passages do implic-
itly carry a significant claim about legal obligation, given Hart's view
(already noted above) that legal validity establishes legal obligation: in
opting for a "wider" concept of legal validity, Hart opts for a "wider"
concept of legal obligation. This leads once again to the conclusion that
Hart would give an affirmative answer to our question, "Does a person
have a legal obligation to obey an unjust law?"
It is important to note that Hart's preference for a "wider" con-
cept of legal validity is not primarily an empirical matter; it is certainly
not to be construed as a denial of the historical influence of morality
upon the law:
[I]t cannot seriously be disputed that the development of law, at
all times and places, has in fact been profoundly influenced both
by the conventional morality and ideals of particular social groups,
and also by forms of enlightened moral criticism urged by in-
dividuals, whose moral horizon has transcended the morality cur-
rently accepted.2 8
Hart cautions, though, that "it is possible to take this truth illicitly, as
a warrant for a different proposition" (which he nevertheless concedes
"may, in some sense, be true") "that a legal system must exhibit some
specific conformity with morality or justice, or must rest on a widely
diffused conviction that there is a moral obligation to obey it."29
From such historical connections between law and morals, Hart
argues "it does not follow . . . that the criteria of legal validity of
particular laws used in a legal system must include, tacitly if not ex-
plicitly, a reference to morality or justice."30 The criteria of legal
validity are found, according to Hart, in the secondary rules of recog-
nition, change and adjudication, not in the conformity of particular
laws-or even of the legal system as a whole-to principles of justice
or morality. Again and again, Hart insists that "municipal legal sys-
27. Pp. 206-07.
28. P. 181 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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tems, with their characteristic structure of primary and secondary
rules, have long endured though they have flouted ... principles of
justice,"31 and that though there are certain (minimal) "requirements
of justice which lawyers term principles of legality" these are "unfortu-
nately compatible with very great iniquity."82 Nonetheless, the valid
primary rules of such systems, even though iniquitously flouting the
principles of justice, presumably impose legal obligations.
III. The Internal Point of View and Legal Validity
As already mentioned, Hart believes the traditional positivist analyses
of law are unacceptable, primarily because they lack certain tools which
he deems essential for an adequate jurisprudential analysis. One
such tool traditional positivism lacks is what Hart calls "the internal
point of view," which he presents in terms of his distinction between
group habits, wherein there is "mere convergence in behavior between
members of a social group... (all may regularly drink tea at breakfast
or go weekly to the cinema)," 33 and social rules (e.g., the rule that the
male head is to be bared upon entering a church, the rules of games
such as chess and cricket, the rules of grammar and of etiquette, etc.). 4
This distinction between group habits and social rules, which Hart
says is "crucial for the understanding of law,"'85 is traceable to three
characteristics of social rules:
[1] where there is such a [social] rule deviations are generally
regarded as lapses or faults open to criticism, and threatened de-
viations meet with pressure for conformity, though the forms of
criticism and pressure differ with different types of rule.
[2] where there are such rules, not only is such criticism in fact
made but deviation from the standard is generally accepted as a
good reason for making it. Criticism for deviation is regarded as
legitimate or justified in this sense, as are demands for compliance
with the standard when deviation is threatened. Moreover, except
by a minority of hardened offenders, such criticism and demands
are generally regarded as legitimate, or made with good reason,
both by those who make them and those to whom they are made.
[3] the internal aspect of rules .... [I]f a social rule is to exist
some at least must look upon the behaviour in question as a gen-
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has an 'internal' aspect, in addition to the external aspect which
it shares with a social habit and which consists in the regular uni-
form behaviour which an observer could record.8 6
The last characteristic, the internal aspect of rules, clearly one of
the most important components of Hart's analysis of law, is further
characterized as follows:
What is necessary is that [1] there should be a critical reflective
attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard,
and that [2] this should display itself in [i] criticism (including self-
criticism), [ii] demands for conformity, and [iii] in acknowledg-
ments that such criticism and demands are justified, [3] all of
which find their characteristic expression in the normative termi-
nology of 'ought', 'must', and 'should', 'right' and 'wrong'.3 7
It is important to emphasize that this "critical reflective attitude" is
directed towards certain patterns of behavior: the behavior in question
is thus seen and criticized in terms of certain rules or norms. There is
no suggestion that the internal point of view involves any particular
approval of the rules themselves, which might be expressed in what I
shall call the "value" or "approval" terminology of 'excellent', 'worthy
of support', 'good', 'valuable', etc. There is a significant difference
between this "value" terminology which attaches to rules and what
Hart calls the "normative terminology" ('ought', 'must', 'should',
'right', 'wrong') which attaches to behavior falling under the rules.88
People who have this "critical reflective attitude" exhibit what
Hart later dubs "the internal point of view," which he contrasts with
"the external point of view" that reflects the positivists' concern with
sheer behavioral phenomena such as "habits of conformity" to laws,
and the likelihood of sanctions being imposed. According to Hart, if
an observer of social behavior "really keeps austerely" to the "extreme"
external point of view,
and does not give any account of the manner in which members
of the group who accept the rules view their own regular be-
haviour, his description of their life cannot be in terms of rules at
all .... Instead, it will be in terms of observable regularities of
conduct, predictions, probabilities, and signs. For such an observer,
deviations by a member of the group from normal conduct will be a
36. Pp. 54-55.
87. P. 56 (numbering inserted).
38. See pp. 57-58 infra, discussing the distinction between the internal and value
points of view.
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sign that hostile reaction is likely to follow, and nothing more.
His view will be like the view of one who, having observed the
working of a traffic signal in a busy street for some time, limits
himself to saying that when the light turns red there is a high
probability that the traffic will stop. 9
An observer from the extreme external point of view would thus be
unable to distinguish between group habits and social rules: although
he would be able to note the characteristic shared by group habits and
social rules alike (namely, the external aspect of the group's regular
uniform behavior), he would be totally unaware, by definition, of the
crucial characteristic which distinguishes social rules from group
habits (namely, that social rules are rule-governed and therefore have
an internal aspect). An analysis of the group habit/social rule distinc-
tion consequently requires the introduction of a number of related
analytical elements: the notion of rule-following, the internal aspect
of rules, and the internal point of view. An analysis of social rules also
yields the distinction between primary rules and secondary rules of
recognition, change and adjudication-for even such a game as base-
ball, with its umpires, rule book and rule book writers, provides quite
a complex network of secondary rules. The analytical elements Hart
uses for his own final analysis of legal validity-such elements as the
notion of rule-following, the internal aspect of rules, the internal point
of view, and the distinction between primary and secondary rules-are
thus discoverable in (derivable from) the mere distinction between
group habits and social rules.40
Throughout the earlier parts of The Concept of Law, Hart insists
that the traditional positivist analysis of legal obligation and legal
validity is inadequate because being external, it systematically ex-
cludes (or "define[s] . . . out of existence") 41 any reference to "the
internal point of view." Accordingly, he asserts that the notions of
39. P. 87.
40. In a summation near the end of the book, Hart makes essentially the same point:
Thus we found it necessary to distinguish from the idea of a general habit that of a
social rule, and to emphasize the internal aspect of rules manifested in their use as
guiding and critical standards of conduct. We then distinguished among rules between
primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudica-
tion. The main theme of this book is that so many of the distinctive operations of
the law, and so many of the ideas which constitute the framework of legal thought,
require for their elucidation reference to one or both of these two types of rule, that
their union may be justly regarded as the 'essence' of law .... Our justification for
assigning to the union of primary and secondary rules this central place is not that
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"legislation, jurisdiction, validity and, generally, of legal powers,
private and public" "demand a reference to the internal point of view
for their analysis. '42 These claims by Hart seem self-evidently true,
given the above contrast between the extreme external point of view
and the internal point of view. An arid analysis from an extreme ex-
ternal point of view which only noted people's behavior in the crudest
way, being unable by definition to note the reasons and the rules
(primary and secondary) behind the behavior, would obviously be
inadequate. So understood, Hart's disenchantment with analyses from
the external point of view is clearly understandable.
Not only is it important to distinguish the internal point of view
from the extreme external point of view which includes too little, but
it is also important not to build too much into the internal point of
view. Playing chess (speaking correctly, behaving with proper manners,
etc.), after all, does not require approval of the rules, morally or other-
wise; one only needs to recognize that there are certain rules and
follow them. Although Hart devotes a great deal of space to distinguish-
ing the internal from the extreme external point of view, he is not so
careful to draw boundaries on the other side of the internal point of
view, distinguishing it from what I shall call the "value" or approval
point of view. Nonetheless, he does give a few hints. He cautions, for
instance, that the "critical reflective attitude" which is necessary for
the internal point of view must not be "misrepresented as a mere
matter of 'feelings'." 43 Even more to the point, in a later discussion"
of legal validity, Hart explicitly distinguishes (1) "an external4 5 state-
ment of fact which an observer of the system might make even if he
did not accept it" (e.g., to say that in England courts, officials and
private persons use as the ultimate rule of recognition the rule that
what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law) from (2) "an internal
42. P. 96.
43. P. 56. Hart is quite insistent on this point:
No doubt, where rules are generally accepted by a social group and generally supported
by social criticism and pressure for conformity, individuals may often have psychologi-
cal experiences analogous to those of restriction or compulsion. When they say they
'feel bound' to behave in certain ways they may indeed refer to these experiences.
But such feelings are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of 'binding'
rules. There is no contradiction in saying that people accept certain rules but ex-
perience no such feelings of compulsion.
P. 56. Cf. pp. 85-86.
44. Pp. 104-05.
45. This, please note, cannot refer to a statement from the extreme external point of
view, which by definition is unable to acknowledge even that other people accept and
follow certain rules. Instead it is a statement from what might be called the "moderate"
external point of view, whereby "the observer may, without accepting the rules himself,
assert that the group accepts the rules, and thus may from outside refer to the way in
which they are concerned with them from the internal point of view." P. 87. Cf. p. 244.
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statement of law asserting the validity of a rule of the system" (e.g., to
say that "a particular enactment is valid, because it satisfies the rule
that what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law"), which is also distin-
guished from (3) "a statement of value" (e.g., to say that "the rule of
recognition of the system is an excellent one and the system based on
it is one worthy of support"). This distinction between "internal"
statements and "value" statements is further reflected in the type of
vocabulary suitable to each. We have already seen that Hart's internal
point of view uses the "normative" terminology of 'ought', 'must',
'should', 'right' and 'wrong' to speak about behavior falling under the
rules; 46 by contrast, the value or approval point of view may use all
these normative terms to talk about behavior falling under the rules
and also use the "value" terminology of 'excellent', 'worthy of sup-
port', and, presumably, 'good', 'valuable', 'bad', 'evil', etc. to talk about
the rules themselves.
It is not hard to see why Hart would want to keep all value or ap-
proval elements out of the internal point of view. The principle of
parsimony of analytical elements demands it: the internal point of view
does not need to have elements of value and approval built into it in
order to yield, in combination with the notion of law as the union of
primary and secondary rules, Hart's analysis of legal validity. The
distinction between the internal and value or approval points of view,
therefore, serves to exclude unnecessary analytical elements. Even more
important, to admit notions of value or approval into the internal
point of view would contaminate Hart's analysis with the sort of ele-
ments explicitly ruled out by his preference for the "wider" sense of
legal validity. To be consistent with the positivist program he must
exclude value elements from his analysis of legal validity, and the
distinction between the internal and value points of view explicitly
assures this exclusion.
IV. Incoherencies in Hart's Analysis of Legal Obligation
An analysis of legal obligation is implicit in the above discussion:
given Hart's analysis of legal validity in terms of certain analytical ele-
ments (the distinction between group habits and social rules, the notion
of the internal point of view, and the distinction between primary and
secondary rules), and given his acceptance of the positivist doctrine that
46. See p. 55 supra.
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legal validity establishes legal obligation, one would expect him to in-
sert a sentence stipulating simply that legal obligation is to be analyzed
in the same way, and with the same analytical tools, as legal validity.
But he does not do this. Although it is not at all clear precisely what he
does do, one thing is certain-instead of a single sentence, Hart devotes
ten pages to what he calls "The Idea of Obligation."47 In these pages
Hart (A) suggests that "to understand the general idea of obligation" is
"a necessary preliminary to understanding it in its legal form, '" 48 and
(B) adopts a particular method of analyzing the concept of obligation,
which method leads him to introduce some new analytical elements-
notably, the distinction between being obliged and having an obliga-
tion,49 and the distinction between social rules which do impose obliga-
tions or duties (e.g., "rules which restrict the free use of violence" and
"rules which require honesty or truth or require the keeping of prom-
ises") ° and those which do not (e.g., "rules of etiquette or correct
speech"). 1
Although no one seems to have noticed it (none of Hart's critics,
friend or foe, nor even Hart himself), The Concept of Law thus presents
two quite different methods for analyzing the concept of legal obliga-
tion: first, a traditional positivist analysis of legal obligation in terms of
(i.e., with the same analytical elements used for) legal validity; and sec-
ond, the analysis of legal obligation in terms of "the general idea of obli-
gation." The hard fact, however, is that Hart is not, qua positivist,
entitled to employ the latter method for analyzing legal obligation.
Strictly speaking, this whole section on "The Idea of Obligation" is un-
necessary for a positivist analysis of legal obligation; an adequate posi-
tivist analysis of obligation in its legal form is available in terms of the
analytical elements used in analyzing legal validity (namely, the dis-
tinction between group habits and social rules, the internal point of
view, and the distinction between primary and secondary rules). The
positivist doctrine that legal validity establishes legal obligation irrepara-
bly cuts the connection between "the general idea of obligation" and
"its legal form," rendering false the claim that understanding the gen-
eral idea of legal obligation is a "necessary preliminary" to understand-
ing obligation in its legal form. Since we can analyze and understand the
47. "The Idea of Obligation" is the title of the second of three sections in Chapter
Five, which is titled "Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules."
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"wider" concept of legal validity without reference to "the general idea
of obligation" we can also, presumably, understand and analyze the
("wider") concept of legal obligation without such a reference. Conse-
quently, to add more analytical elements, which is what Hart does in
these ten pages, is to violate the dictum to eschew excess analytical ele-
ments. More important, though, I shall argue that Hart's reference to
"the general idea of obligation" compromises his positivist position by
importing value-charged elements into his analysis.
The remedy would seem to be obvious: simply delete the offensive ten
pages.52 This would be a serious mistake, however, not simply because
Hart obviously thinks it important to use the method of analysis pre-
sented in these pages, nor even because this method is interesting on its
own merits and yields interesting analytical elements, but mainly be-
cause these pages point the way to a much more adequate method of ana-
lyzing legal obligation than is to be found in the traditional positivist
analysis in terms of legal validity. Accordingly, in the next section I shall
suggest a way to save Hart's method of analyzing legal obligation in
terms of the general idea of obligation. First, though, we must acquire
a better idea of this method of analysis.
As already noted, Hart adopts a particular method of analyzing the
concept of obligation in his section on "The Idea of Obligation," and
that method leads him to introduce some new analytical elements. One
of these new elements is the distinction between being obliged and
having an obligation, which is illustrated in what Hart calls "the gun-
man situation":
A orders B to hand over his money and threatens to shoot him if
he does not comply.... The plausibility of the claim that the gun-
man situation displays the meaning of obligation lies in the fact
that it is certainly one in which we would say that B, if he obeyed,
was 'obliged' to hand over his money. It is, however, equally cer-
tain that we should misdescribe the situation if we said, on these
facts, that B 'had an obligation' or a 'duty' to hand over the
money .... There is a difference . . . between the assertion that
someone was obliged [his emphasis] to do something and the as-
sertion that he had an obligation [his emphasis] to do it. 53
The broad outlines of this obliged/obligation distinction should be
fairly clear from the above, without going into further detail. What
52. The feasibility of this remedy is confirmed by consulting the text. The flow of
argument from the first section to the third (and last) section of Chapter Five ("Law as
the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules') would not be impaired, and perhaps even
enhanced, by the simple removal of section two on "The Idea of Obligation."
53. P. 80 (emphasis added, unless otherwise noted).
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might not be so dear, however, is that Hart establishes this distinction
by appealing to our intuitions regarding the application of the general
concept of obligation (or, if you will, he points to the use of 'obli-
gation' and other terms). Thus the above passage includes such locu-
tions (emphasized above) as: 'The plausibility of the claim that . . .
displays the meaning of obligation lies in the fact that.. .', 'certainly...
we would say.. .', 'equally certain... we should misdescribe... if we
said.. .', 'There is a difference ... between the assertion ... and the
assertion . . .'. A steady stream of such appeals characterizes Hart's con-
tinued discussion of this obliged/obligation distinction." These are
clearly not presented as inferences derivable from some basic set of
axioms nor as arbitrary, dogmatic stipulations of Hart's own idiosyn-
cratic jargon; instead, they are appeals to the reader's own, indepen-
dent, pre-formed intuitions about the idea of obligation (or, about the
use of 'obligation' and other terms). Hart's entire argument here
consists of this sort of appeal to the reader's (linguistic) intuitions, a
familiar type of argument in contemporary, ordinary language phi-
losophy.
The other major distinction in "The Idea of Obligation" is estab-
lished by the same kind of appeal:
[T]hough a grasp of the elements generally differentiating social
rules from mere habits is certainly indispensable for understanding
the notion of obligation or duty, it is not sufficient by itself.
The statement that someone has or is under an obligation does
indeed imply the existence of rule; yet it is not always the case that
where rules exist the standard of behaviour required by them is
conceived of in terms of obligation. 'He ought to have' and 'He
had an obligation to' are not always interchangeable expressions,
even though they are alike in carrying an implicit reference to ex-
isting standards of conduct or are used in drawing conclusions in
particular cases from a general rule. Rules of etiquette or correct
speech are certainly rules: they are more than convergent habits
or regularities of behaviour; they are taught and efforts are made
54. The following long list of passages is drawn from a paragraph less than a page in
length: 'It seems clear that we should not think of B as obliged to ... if. .' 'Nor per-
haps should we say that B was obliged, if.. .', 'though such references to ... are implicit
in this notion, the statement that a person was obliged to obey someone is . . .', 'But the
statement that someone had an obligation to do something is of a very different type', 'the
facts about B's action and . . . though sufficient to warrant the statement that B was
obliged . . . are not sufficient to warrant the statement that he had an obligation', 'facts
of this sort... are not necessary for the truth of a statement that a person had an obliga-
tion to do something', 'the statement that a person had an obligation . . . remains true
even if . .', 'whereas the statement that he had this obligation is quite independent of
.... the statement that someone was obliged to do something, normally carries the im-
plication that . . .'. Pp. 80-81.
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to maintain them; they are used in criticizing our own and other
people's behaviour in the characteristic normative vocabulary.
'You ought to take your hat off', 'It is wrong to say "you was"'.
But to use in connexion with rules of this kind the words 'obliga-
tion' or 'duty' would be misleading and not merely stylistically
odd. It would misdescribe a social situation; for though the line
separating [I] rules of obligation from [II] others is at points a
vague one, yet the main rationale of the distinction is fairly
clear.55
It is not necessary to repeat the phrases which appeal to the reader's
intuitions about the idea of obligation (or about the use of 'obligation'
and other terms), for Hart's method of argument should by now be
clear enough. What now demands our attention is the distinction, made
explicitly in the last sentence quoted but implicit in the whole passage,
separating [I] "rules of obligation," presumably these are social rules
or practices which impose obligation (where the use of 'obligation'
or 'duty' does not "mislead" or "misdescribe") from [II] "others,"
presumably social rules or practices which do not impose obligation
(apparently, where the use of 'obligation' or 'duty' would "mislead"
and "misdescribe"). Examples of the latter sort of social rules are rules
of etiquette or correct speech; examples of the former, Hart later in-
dicates, are rules "which restrict the free use of violence" and "rules
which require honesty or truth or require the keeping of promises."5 6
Three preliminary points need to be kept in mind regarding this dis-
tinction, in Chapter Five, between what I shall call [I] obligation rules
and [II] non-obligation rules. First, it is a distinction which is made
within the domain of another distinction-Chapter Four's distinction
between group habits and social rules. In effect, Chapter Five tells us
there are two sorts of social rules: obligation rules and non-obligation
rules. Second, we have already seen that Hart uses the group habit/
social rule distinction to generate the key analytical elements for ana-
lyzing legal validity: the internal point of view and the distinction be-
tween primary and secondary rules. Third, it must again be repeated
that this Chapter Five distinction seems unnecessary for the analysis
of legal obligation, in light of Hart's acceptance of the positivist doc-
trine that legal validity establishes legal obligation.
Not only is the distinction between obligation rules and non-ob-
ligation rules unnecessary, and hence counter to the positivists' attempt
to omit unnecessary analytical elements, but it seems to be ultimately
55. Pp. 83-84 (emphasis and numbering added).
56. P. 85.
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irreconcilable with the positivist insistence that analyses of legal con-
cepts make no value-charged appeals. Conveniently enough, the evi-
dence that this distinction does indeed make a nonpositivistic appeal,
i.e., that it covertly smuggles in the value point of view, is discoverable
in the way Hart draws it. He says that three factors "distinguish rules
of obligation from other rules":
[a] the general demand for conformity is insistent and the
social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten
to deviate is great .... What is important is that the insistence on
importance or seriousness of social pressure behind the rules is the
primary factor determining whether they are thought of as giving
rise to obligations;
[b] [t]he rules supported by this serious pressure are thought
important because they are believed to be necessary to the mainte-
nance of social life or some highly prized feature of it;
[c] it is generally recognized that the conduct required by these
rules may, while benefiting others, conflict with what the person
who owes the duty may wish to do. Hence obligations and duties
are thought of as characteristically involving sacrifice or renuncia-
tion, and the standing possibility of conflict between obligation or
duty and interest is, in all societies, among the truisms of both the
lawyer and the moralist.57
This three-fold characterization of the discussion between obligation
rules and non-obligation rules, however, seriously undercuts Hart's
analysis of the idea of obligation because it inadvertently injects certain
value or approval elements into statements of obligation. In presenting
these three characteristics, Hart adopts a kind of "external" point of
view: he makes the (outsider's) observation that rules are thought of,
or are spoken of, as giving rise to obligation when (a) the rules are
supported by a general, insistent demand for conformity, and great
social pressure is brought to bear upon those who deviate from the
rules, (b) the rules are thought of as necessary to the maintenance of
social life or, at least, to some highly prized feature of it, and (c) the
rules are thought of as characteristically involving sacrifice or renun-
ciation. An outsider could, of course, note that others regard (value,
57. Pp. 84-85. I do not here intend to question the aptness and accuracy of this charac-
terization of the idea of obligation, although this has, with some justice, been disputed.
Richard Bernstein argues both that these three characteristics are not sufficient to establish
obligation (among the social elite, for example, rules of etiquette might be very seriously
supported) and that they are not necessary ("does the acceptance of . . .a noxious rule
by even a majority of the community impose an obligation on any individual? .. .Fre-
quently, the seriousness of social pressure behind the rules must be challenged if we are
to live up to our obligations'). Professor Hart on Rules of Obligation, 73 MIND 563, 564-
65 (1964).
The Yale Law Journal
approve of) the rules in such a way without himself sharing that ap-
proval-he might think of them as silly, or even as evil.58 This suggests
an ambiguity in statements of the form 'A has an obligation to do x':
on the one hand, the statement might be made from the "outside" and
simply mean something like 'the rules are generally thought (by others)
so important, necessary, valuable, etc., that it is generally insisted not
merely that A ought to do x but that A has an obligation or duty to do
x'; on the other hand, it might be made from the "inside" and mean
something like 'I approve of and agree with the general insistence that
the rules are so important, necessary, valuable, etc., that A not only
ought to do x but that A has an obligation or duty to do x'. Similarly,
the question 'A has an obligation to do x, don't you think?' makes
an ambiguous appeal: on the one hand, it might simply make an "out-
sider's" appeal and mean something like 'don't you (fellow outsider)
observe that the rules are generally thought (by others) so important,
necessary, valuable, etc., that it is generally insisted not merely that A
ought to do x but that A has an obligation or duty to do x?'; on the
other hand, it might make an "insider's" appeal and mean something
like 'don't you agree with the rest of us that the rules are so important,
necessary, valuable, etc., that A not only ought to do x but that A has
an obligation or duty to do x?'
Clearly no one could make an "inside" obligation assertion or could
answer (affirmatively or negatively) an "insider's" appeal about the
ascription of obligation without necessarily making some value judg-
ments of his own regarding the importance, necessity and value of the
relevant social rules. What has been called the value or approval point
of view, then, would seem to be inextricably involved in anyone's
(inside) assertion of obligation and in anyone's replies to (insiders') ap-
peals regarding the assertion of obligation. By contrast, one's own value
judgments about the social rules are clearly not involved when one makes
an "outside" obligation assertion or when one answers (affirmatively or
negatively) an "outsider's" appeal about the ascription of obligation.
Nonetheless, "outside" obligation statements do involve what Hart
calls the internal point of view, simply because all rule-aware state-
ments about social rules necessarily involve the internal point of view.
58. Hart himself recognizes that allegiance to a legal system might be based on such
diverse considerations as "calculations of long-term interest; disinterested interest in
others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others
do. There is indeed no reason why those who accept the authority of the system should
not examine their conscience and decide that, morally, they ought not to accept it, yet
for a variety of reasons continue to do so." Pp. 198-99.
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Two questions thus arise: what sorts of assertions and appeals does
Hart use? and what sorts ought he to use? By now, the answer to the
latter question should be clear: Hart ought to use only "outside" ob-
ligation assertions and he ought to make only "outsider" appeals. Other-
wise his obligation assertions would become necessarily infected with
his own value point of view and his appeals would activate the reader's
value point of view-all of which would compromise, as has already
been indicated,5 9 his attempt to provide a neutral, value-free, positivist
analysis of legal concepts. He cannot, after all, provide a value-free anal-
ysis of legal obligation if he first insists that the analysis of the idea of
obligation is a "necessary preliminary" to such an analysis and then
contaminates the preliminary analysis with appeals to his own, and his
readers', value judgments.
Although Hart should restrict himself to "outside" assertions and
appeals, this is not, it seems, what he does. We have already noted, for
instance, that he establishes the obliged/obligation distinction by means
of appeals to the reader's (value-charged?) intuitions regarding ob-
ligation ascription: 60 'certainly . . . we would say', 'equally certain
... we should misdescribe . . . if we said . . .'. These certainly look
like insiders' appeals, especially in the absence of any explicit attempt to
show they are not. Furthermore, those same passages seem to contain
"inside" assertions about obligation: 'the statement that someone had
an obligation to do something is of a very different type . . .', 'the
facts about B's action and.., though sufficient to warrant the statement
that B was obliged ... are not sufficient to warrant the statement that
he had an obligation', 'the statement that a person had an obligation
... remains true even if.. .', and so forth. And elsewhere we find Hart
making the seemingly "inside" assertion that "To promise is to say
something which creates an obligation for the promisor .
59. See p. 58 supra.
60. See pp. 60-62 supra.
61. P. 42. This ambiguity between inside and outside assertions and appeals about
obligations points up, in turn, a corresponding ambiguity in Hart's notion of "the
internal point of view." Regarding the group habit/social rule distinction in Chapter
Four, we have seen that all value elements should be, can be, and are excluded from the
internal point of view. And they could even remain excluded in Chapter Five's distinction
between social rules which impose obligation and those which do not, if the internal point
of view were restricted to "outside" assertions and appeals about obligation. But it is
not; in crucial passages value elements seem to be smuggled into the internal point of
view by inadvertently associating it with "inside" obligation assertions and appeals. In
the following quote, for example, '[O]' notes the (value-tainted) use of "internal
point of view" which is "required" for the analysis of obligation, as distinct from non-
obligation, rules; '[R]' notes the (untainted) use which points merely to the group habit/
social rule distinction; and '[?]' notes an uncertain use.
Under the simple regime of primary rules the internal point of view [01 is manifested
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It might seem tempting to eliminate whatever value judgments are
implicit in Hart's ("inside") assertions and appeals about obligation by
turning them into explicitly "outside" assertions and appeals-con-
verting all instances of 'we would say' into 'they would say', and
changing 'to promise is to say something which creates an obligation
for the promisor . . .' into 'to promise is to say something which is
generally believed to create an obligation for the promisor .. .', etc.02
By purifying in this way, it would probably be possible to keep Hart's
analysis of the idea of obligation consistent with his positivist program
(which would not, however, alter the fact that such an analysis is un-
necessary in the first place). Nevertheless, this tactic would be ultimately
unsatisfactory; if we were to turn Hart's entire analysis of the idea of
obligation into an "outside" analysis, much of worth would be lost and
many new problems would arise. A strict diet of "outside" assertions
and appeals about obligation would be clinical in tone and empirical
in nature; everything would suddenly turn upon sociological facts and
methods, not upon conceptual or philosophical issues. The discussion
would be confined to documented description of existing prescriptions,
leaving no place for the sort of undocumented (because "inside"?) as-
sertions and appeals about the idea of obligation, and about the ordi-
nary use of 'obligation' which characterize Hart's discussion. All this
raises many larger issues about the nature and the role of philosophical
analysis in general, and of the analysis of moral concepts in particular.
I cannot, of course, pursue such complicated matters here, but must be
content with suggesting that when ordinary language analysis is used
for explicating moral discourse, the analysis seems destined to be some-
what value-tinged, i.e., to be marked by various "inside" appeals and
assertions.
There is, perhaps, an historical explanation for Hart's presentation
of two ultimately irreconcilable methods of analyzing legal obligation
(in terms of the doctrine that legal validity establishes legal obligation,
in its simplest form, in the use of those rules as the basis of criticism, and as the
justification of demands for conformity, social pressure, and punishment. Reference
to this most elementary manifestation of the internal point of view [0] is required for
the analysis of the basic concepts of obligation and duty. With the addition to the
system of secondary rules, the range of what is said and done from the internal point
of view [?] is much extended and diversified. With this extension comes a whole set of
new concepts and they demand a reference to the internal point of view [R] for their
analysis. These include the notions of legislation, jurisdiction, validity and, generally,
of legal powers, private and public.
P. 96 (emphasis and notations added).
62. These "outside" assertions and appeals might go under the label "moderate exter-
nal" (see note 45 supra) or, perhaps, be described as "rule-aware (internal) statements
about others' value-approval attitudes."
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on the one hand, and in terms of the general idea of obligation, on the
other). The first method, which is the traditional positivist method of
analyzing legal obligation, is inherited from John Austin, the nine-
teenth century positivist. The second method, which uses the techniques
of modern, ordinary language philosophers, clearly owes much to Hart's
relationship with, among others, J. L. Austin.63 Although Hart's com-
bination of these two separate methods of analysis generally produces
illuminating results, when he turns to the analysis of the concept of
legal obligation there arise irresolvable (though unintended and ap-
parently unnoticed) tensions between Hart the descendant of John
Austin and Hart the colleague of J. L. Austin. The positivist search
for pure, value-free analytical elements was of no particular importance
to J. L. Austin, and there is no especial reason to expect, or to require,
an ordinary language analysis of terms in moral discourse (such as 'ob-
ligation', etc.) to eschew value-tinged assertions and appeals. Although
this makes Hart's discussion of legal obligation incoherent, we shall see
that this incoherency can be remedied. We shall also see that the method
of analyzing legal obligation in terms of an ordinary language analysis
of the use of 'obligation' (or, of the general idea of obligation) is
superior to the traditional positivist method of analyzing legal obliga-
tion in terms of legal validity.
V. Towards a More Adequate View
Whenever an incoherency appears in a position, a number of alter-
native moves are possible: simply renounce the entire position, abandon
or amend one of the claims explicitly leading to the incoherency, or dig
about for any possible underlying, unnoticed and expendable dogmas
contributing to the incoherency. In this case the latter course is the
fruitful one, and I shall argue that the above incoherency in Hart's
position is ultimately traceable to the positivist doctrines that the anal-
ysis of legal obligation requires the same analytical tools as the analysis
of legal validity, and that legal validity establishes legal obligation.
Hopefully, this venture, which like all philosophical diagnoses and pre-
scriptions is conjectural and uncertain, will help point the way out of
the positivist/natural law impasse which has too long dominated and
hampered legal philosophy.
We have been discussing three of Hart's central doctrines: (1) the
63. In the years after the war Hart and Austin used to conduct a class together at
Oxford. J.L. AusTrN, PHimosoPHIcAL PAPERs 143 n.1 (1961).
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preference for a "wider" view of legal validity, (2) the belief that legal
validity establishes legal obligation, and (3) the claim that understand-
ing the idea of obligation is a necessary preliminary to understanding
legal obligation. The first two are traditional, orthodox positivist doc-
trines; the third is not. Although Hart's attempt to introduce the third
doctrine into his system is a step in the right direction, it is too timid a
step. He underestimates the cohesiveness of the traditional positivist
position: the first and second doctrines, which together imply a "wider"
view of legal obligation, are incompatible with the third, as we have
seen. Consequently, if Hart wishes to retain the latter, he must reject
one of the first two doctrines. Which one? In light of the remarkable
fact that Hart accepts the second doctrine without any argument at all,
whereas he gives rather lengthy arguments for the first, the second doc-
trine seems most expendable. The likeliest strategy, therefore, is to
amend Hart's position by asserting (A) that the analysis of legal ob-
ligation requires different analytical elements than does the analysis of
the ("wider") concept of legal validity and (B) that legal validity does
not establish legal obligation.
According to this amended position, legal validity would only estab-
lish "legally obliged" (namely, one should expect the authorities to
apply sanctions if they catch him deviating from the rule, or law, in
question),64 but it would not necessarily establish legal obligation. The
difference between legally obliged and legal obligation is that the
former can be analyzed with pure, value-free elements, but the latter
cannot; whereas the analysis of the concept of being legally obliged
demands reference to the (value-free) internal point of view, the anal-
ysis of legal obligation demands reference to the internal and to the
value points of view-it necessarily involves "inside" assertions and ap-
peals about obligation. At this point it becomes coherent, appropriate
and useful to assert (even from the "inside") that obligations are im-
posed by those rules which are strongly approved, highly valued and
seriously supported by most people. An analysis of legal obligation (but
not of legally obliged) would be inadequate if it omitted mention of
this.
An adequate analysis of legal obligation requires even more: it must
64. I am here using a somewhat wider notion of being "obliged" than can be found
in the gunman situation, which is characterized by the total absence of rules. After all,
the notion of being obliged, as distinct from having an obligation, is also intelligible-
and even helpful-in rule-governed contexts. Imagine, for example, the gunman, without
his gun and wearing a business suit, explaining to a shopkeeper the rather elaborate
procedures for making monthly protection payments---or else.
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also account for the intelligibility of declaring that these "approved"
and valued rules may be wrong-even though they are supported by
a wide majority. Simply because many, or even most, people think
certain rules are good guides to conduct does not necessarily mean
that declarations to the contrary are unintelligible, or even false.
Recognizing this, Hart distinguished 5 between "accepted" (or "shared"
or "conventional") morality, "private" morality, and "enlightened"
morality-all of which aim at the "true" morality.6 6 Although most
of the earlier discussions in The Concept of Law only discuss "accepted"
or "shared" or "conventional" morality, Hart is aware that "morality
has its private aspect" 67 and that there can be "moral principles or
moral ideals which may govern an individual's life, but which he does
not share with any considerable number of those with whom he lives."' 68
In addition to scattered references to "private" morality, Hart occa-
sionally alludes to "enlightened" and "true" morality: he suggests, for
example, that valid laws may "offend against a society's own morality
or against what we may hold to be an enlightened or true morality"; 69
similarly, if there are indeed certain basic protections and freedoms to
which everyone in a legal system is entitled, then "the enlightened
morality which recognizes these rights has special credentials as the true
morality, and is not just one among many possible moralities." 70 Hart
thus offers quite a complex matrix which can be used in the analysis of
legal obligation.
The difference between the concepts of being legally obliged and
having a legal obligation may be characterized in terms of this matrix:
the analysis of the concept of legal obligation, unlike the analysis of the
concept of being legally obliged, "demands" reference to the "true"
principles of morality and justice, as glimpsed through the spectacles of
"accepted," "enlightened," and "private" morality.71 The tasks of de-
65. See pp. 164-65, 176-81, 201-07.
66. Bernstein seems to overlook this when he suggests Hart fails to recognize that
"There is nothing self-contradictory about claiming that an obligation exists even when
the general demand for conformity is not insistent and there is little or no social pressure
brought to bear on those who deviate or threaten to deviate." Supra note 57, at 564.
67. P. 179.
68. P. 165.
69. P. 205 (emphasis added).
70. P. 201 (emphasis added).
71. I believe this separation of "legal obligation" from "legally obliged" provides what
some of Hart's more distinguished critics feel is lacking in his position. See, for example,
Dworkin's call for a treatment of "principles" as well as "rules": "I call a 'principle' a
standard that is to be observed ... because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or
some other dimension of morality." The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 23 (1967).
Similarly, see Singer's claim that Hart's "analytical" jurisprudence "needs to be supple-
mented by an approach from the point of view of what I prefer to call 'normative
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veloping criteria for identifying and evaluating these moralities and of
exploring the interrelations between them far exceed the limits of this
study. The point to be made here is that this task is a necessary one in
analyzing the concept of legal obligation-though not in analyzing the
concept of legal validity and its correlate concept of being legally
obliged. Consequently, quite different criteria are involved in the
application of these two concepts. On the one hand, to apply the con-
cept of being legally obliged (or, to assert that one is legally obliged by
a given law) simply involves the (value-free) recognition that the law
in question is valid, i.e., that the law passes all the tests provided by
the rule of recognition, and that the law will be enforced. On the
other hand, to apply the concept of legal obligation (or, to assert, from
the "inside," that a given law imposes a legal obligation) involves the
(value-charged) recognition that the law conforms to the "true" prin-
ciples of justice and morality, that it serves the public interest, the
general welfare, etc.
The positivist might object that the above distinction between legally
obliged and legal obligation is an unnecessarily redundant mirror of
the positivists' traditional distinction between legal obligation and
moral obligation. In answer to this, I believe it can be shown that the
concept of moral obligation is distinct from the concept of legal obliga-
tion. (That it is distinct from legally obliged is obvious: neither entails
the other, and many of the analytical tools required for the analysis of
either one are not required for the analysis of the other.) Clearly, moral
obligation does not entail legal obligation, for we have many moral ob-
ligations that are not legal obligations. Nor does legal obligation entail
moral obligation, as is illustrated by the possibility that one might, on
occasion and in exceptional circumstances, have a moral obligation to
violate a legal obligation, e.g., to break the speed limit in rushing to the
hospital, or, perhaps, to steal a rich man's loaf of bread to feed a starving
family, or, possibly, to remain with one's ailing mother despite the call
of the draft board. Consider the latter case: assume the son knows his
mother has a terminal illness which will end her life before the courts
will manage to send him to prison; assume further that he regards as
just and necessary (1) the government's general right to draft citizens
for military duty, (2) its specific current draft procedures, and (8) its
current military operations. In light of such considerations as these, he
freely concedes that he is not just legally obliged to cooperate with the
jurisprudence' (which would rest on the basis of an adequate ethical theory)." Supra
note 3, at 220.
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draft, but also that he has a legal obligation to do so. Still, quite dif-
ferent considerations lead him to conclude that he has an overriding
obligation to ignore the draft call, thereby remaining with his helpless
mother during her last months. Both sets of considerations, those regard-
ing his legal obligations and those regarding his moral obligation, appeal
to the "true" principles of morality, justice and fairness; but they do so
in different ways and with different things in mind.
The difference between moral and legal obligation appears in other
contexts, too. The above draft example concerns a situation where one
recognizes he is legally obliged and has a legal obligation to obey a law,
yet decides he has a moral obligation to disobey it. The distinction be-
tween legal obligation and moral obligation is also visible in situations
where one recognizes he is legally obliged, denies he has any legal obli-
gation, yet believes he has a moral obligation to behave in a certain way.
This occurs72 in the area of "private" morality where one's view of his
moral obligations coincides with the strictures of the law (which pro-
hibit, say, alcohol, adultery, abortion, incest, marijuana or homosex-
uality) yet one denies that he has any corresponding legal obligation
because such matters are not, in the words of the Wolfenden Report,
"the law's business." 73 In all such cases we find one set of considerations
leading to the conclusion that one has no legal obligation to behave in
the way prescribed by a particular law (though the validity of the law
means one is legally obliged to do so), while another set of considerations
leads to the conclusion that one nonetheless has a moral obligation so
to behave.
Or again, it is often suggested that the conscientious objector's re-
fusal to serve in the armed forces has only to do with his own view of his
moral obligations. And this is true, but it is not all of the truth; in addi-
tion to the dimension of personal moral obligation the question of con-
scientious objection also embraces a dimension of legal obligation.
Imagine, for instance, that our draft law had no provisions for con-
scientious objection (or imagine a bill in Congress proposing to elim-
inate all such provisions). What would we want to say about such a
(proposed) draft law? Many things, but surely not that it was just a
72. It also includes the case, for example, of the intimidated family man who, reason-
ing that his family responsibilities impose upon him a moral obligation to avoid the
threatened sanctions, "knuckles under" and does what the law orders (wears a yellow
star, pays the war tax, etc.), nonetheless maintaining that the particular law in question
does not impose any legal obligation because it undermines certain principles of justice
and morality.
73. EPORT OF TEE COMMITrEE ON HoMosExuAL OFFENSES AND PROsTITUTION, COMUMD.
No. 247, at 24 (1957).
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matter of certain young men's view of their personal moral obligations.
Clearly, there is more to the question than the very real and very im-
portant dimension of moral obligation; there is also the dimension of
legal obligation which involves different sorts of considerations-con-
siderations which confront a much wider audience than the immediate
group of prospective conscientious objectors faced by the draft. In such
a matter the question of legal obligation, unlike the question of moral
obligation, confronts everyone (the officials in their respective chambers
as well as the man on the street), exposing as inexcusably obtuse and
evasive, at best, the suggestion that this matter is confined to the per-
sonal moral obligation of certain young men. It would also, obviously,
be unsatisfactory to defer to the existing positive law, for that would
only speak to the question of one's being legally obliged-which we
have seen is quite different from the question of legal obligation.
At least two things are thus clear. First, those who are not officials are
qualified and entitled to deliberate about questions of legal obligation;
some ordinary man on the street might, on occasion, even have keener
insight into such a question than the judge in his chambers. (Both
officials and non-officials may have a moral obligation to deliberate
about questions of legal obligation, which is not to say that their
deliberations are about moral-instead of legal-obligation.) Second,
no official is an infallible oracle for settling questions of legal obligation;
an official might be wrong, after all, when he asserts that A has a legal
obligation to do x. Indeed the theory proposed here reminds us that
when officials make, amend, or interpret a rule they do not necessarily
create a legal obligation; unless the resulting rules accord with prin-
ciples of justice and morality, they merely make the affected citizens
legally obliged-for legal obligation is not solely a matter of coercion,
threat, force and sanctions.74
Nonetheless, quite a helpful glimpse of those things relevant to the
question of legal obligation is obtainable if we try to picture the careful,
conscientious and competent deliberations of officials in a legal system.
It is generally believed, for instance, that the legislator's reasons for in-
troducing, supporting or opposing an item of legislation, or a judge's
reasons for dissenting or for overruling well-established precedent, are
not supposed to turn upon personal needs and wants (concern for an
74. Although this theory could not (nor, so far as I can see, could any other) pass Hart's
test of stopping incorrigibly wicked men from enacting wicked legislation (see p. 52
supra), most legal systems boast at least a few officials who are not incorrigibly wicked (they
may, for instance, be well-meaning but corrigible), and these officials might well find the
distinction between legally obliged and legal obligation rather helpful.
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ailing mother, a pay-off, etc.), nor upon the needs and wants of a small
but influential interest group (or even, it would seem, of a temporarily
hysterical, repression-minded majority), nor upon the mere flip of a
coin. Instead, we expect such officials to deliberate about questions of
the public interest, the general welfare, the principles of justice and
morality.
There is, of course, no mechanical test for answering such questions,
although we can give at least a partial list of the factors relevant to such
an answer. Whenever a conflict arises between the interests of the state
and the interests of an individual, for example, the existing positive law
must be considered (though not necessarily perpetuated), along with the
political, legal and cultural traditions of the people involved. In the
United States, accordingly, we give considerable weight to questions of
due process, equal protection and individual liberty. Also, the 'various
needs, wants and moral beliefs of the majority must be given substantial
weight, as well as the needs, wants and moral beliefs of minority groups
-all of which must be seen in the context of the economic, socio-
logical and technological structure of the society. These are some, at
least, of the factors involved in determining legal obligation. I do not
intend to offer, nor do I believe it especially fruitful to seek, an a priori,
universally applicable formula for measuring the weight of these respec-
tive considerations, balancing them against each other, and identifying
the most satisfactory solution to each specific problem. The point here
is more modest: simply that any adequate analysis of the concept of
legal obligation must refer to these factors. They often make questions
of legal obligation extremely difficult, but not always. It is quite clear,
for instance, that we have a legal obligation (i.e., we are not merely
legally obliged) not to rape, steal, murder, etc. Other questions of legal
obligation, however, are not so easily settled, not even when the highest
court announces its view on the matter (though the Supreme Court's
verdict does, of course, settle the questions of legal validity and of being
legally obliged). This difficulty is just one of the frustrating facts of the
world, and is not lessened-indeed it is aggravated-by the positivists'
attempt to shove all questions about justice and morality "outside" the
province of jurisprudence.
One of the most important tasks facing any legal theory is the task of
distinguishing three concepts: the concept of being legally obliged, the
concept of legal obligation, and the concept of moral obligation. The
view here proposed preserves each of these as distinct. These concepts
do not, after all, entail each other: to establish that a law is legally valid
(that is, that one is legally obliged) does not entail that it imposes a legal
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or moral obligation; similarly, to establish that one has a legal obliga-
tion to act in a certain manner does not entail that one is legally obliged
to do so, nor even that one has a corresponding (binding)75 moral obliga-
tion; or again, to establish that one has a moral obligation does not
entail that one is legally obliged or that one has a corresponding legal
obligation. Furthermore, these three concepts are distinct, I believe, be-
cause a different set of considerations seems necessary for analyzing and
applying each of them. While the elements discoverable in the group
habit/social rule distinction suffice for an adequate analysis and applica-
tion of a "wider" concept of legal validity (and its correlate concept of
being legally obliged), it is necessary to add to these the elements dis-
coverable in the general idea of obligation for an adequate analysis and
application of the concept of legal obligation; and even different con-
siderations (or, at the least, a different method for balancing the same
sort of considerations) seem to be required for the analysis and applica-
tion of the concept of moral obligation. Perhaps the most serious flaw
in the positivist position is the failure to note these differences: think-
ing (wrongly) that all considerations about obligation are the same,
and reasoning (correctly) that moral obligation falls outside the prov-
ince of jurisprudence, positivists end up (mistakenly) banishing the
above-mentioned considerations relevant to legal obligation from the
province of jurisprudence.
We have seen that Hart subscribes to the positivist orthodoxy of col-
lapsing the notion of legal obligation into the notion of being legally
obliged-despite his emphasis upon the distinction between the general
(non-legal) notions of being obliged and having an obligation. This
collapse, however, traps Hart in serious, fundamental incoherencies: he
provides a method of analyzing legal obligation which is not only un-
necessary, given his positivistic program, but is ultimately irreconcilable
with that program; furthermore, although he stresses the importance of
distinguishing between the general (non-legal) notions of being obliged
and having an obligation, he provides no correlate distinction for the
legal sphere. If the distinction between legal obligation and legally ob-
liged were preserved in Hart's system, though, these incoherencies
would be removed.
In addition to this curative power for Hart's system, the distinction
between being legally obliged and having a legal obligation suggests a
possible, and very plausible, reconciliation of the positivist and natural
75. Mere prima facie moral obligations, I mean to suggest, are not binding moral
obligations.
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law impasse, still accounting for what both sides seem to have wanted
to say. On the one hand, the view I am proposing agrees with the natural
law insistence that the principles of justice and morality have a legiti-
mate place (as analytical tools) in the province of jurisprudence, though
my view assigns them to a particular place-the analysis of legal obliga-
tion. The natural law view cannot make such a pin-point assignment,
since it fails to draw the distinction between legal obligation and legal
validity. On the other hand, the proposed view accommodates the posi-
tivist insistence that it is possible to give an adequate, clear, hard-
headed, account of legal validity, free of any appeal to the principles
of justice and morality; my view, however, adds that legal validity only
establishes that one is legally obliged and that an adequate analysis of
legal obligation must appeal to the principles of justice and morality.
The positivist position can neither appreciate nor imitate this move,
since it fails to distinguish between legally obliged and legal obliga-
tion.
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